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Despite a limited scope, the Services Directive contains some powerful provisions,
extending the scope of Art.49 by abolishing mandatory requirements, and calling
for significant harmonisation of public administration. Its relationship to the Treaty
Articles on free movement, whether it only applies to out-of-state service providers,
or some of its provisions can be relied on by those established in-state, and whether
it has an adequate legal basis are among the more important questions it raises.
Introduction
The Services Directive raises so many questions it is difficult to know where to start.1
This article will highlight what are felt to be the major ones, but cannot pretend to
be exhaustive. They are these: does the Directive change the substantive law on free
movement of services and establishment? How does it relate to the existing case law
of the Court of Justice? Regarding the provisions on administrative simplification: are
they feasible, practical, or within the bounds of EU competence? And perhaps most
importantly of all: does the Directive only apply to cross-border situations, or can it be
relied on by domestic providers?
The answers are sometimes surprising. There has seemed to be a public consensus that
after compromise in the legislative process a once radical and important document
is now a tame and even regressive one. On the contrary, there appear upon closer
examination to be quite a few teeth left on this beast. It extends the concept of
free movement beyond what the Treaty itself calls for, or even perhaps authorises,
challenging conventional understandings of legislative competence; its country of origin
principle allocates competitors on a single market different rights according to their state
of establishment, creating what Community lawyers (although not economists) might
call distortions of competition and violations of non-discrimination; its provisions for
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simplifying formalities can be seen plausibly, and even probably, as a programme for the
harmonisation of public administration; and finally, the Directive appears to abolish the
internal exception with respect to establishment, extending to domestic establishees the
legal rights previously only granted to migrants. This is more than enough to keep lawyers
happy for a while. The developments are, however, almost entirely to be regretted, the
Directive apparently having been written without any thought for its incidental effects
on non-trade matters or for the proper division of powers between the EU and states.
After a lengthy Preamble, which given the ambiguities found in the Directive may be
or more than usual importance, the Directive is divided into eight chapters, of which
the first six deal with substance. These address the Directive’s scope, administrative
simplification, establishment, then services, consumer protection for recipients of
services, and obligations of co-operation on national authorities.
The scope of application of the Directive
The Directive applies to all services provided normally for remuneration, and provided
by a provider established in the EU,2 except for a fairly long and important list. These
exceptions include financial services, electronic communications services, transport,
temporary work agencies, and healthcare, gambling, audiovisual, private security and
social services.3 The Directive is also (superfluously, since they are non-economic) stated
not to apply to non-economic services of general interest.4 However, economic services
of general interest are not, as such, excluded. Thus in so far as education is provided for
remuneration it is covered.5
It is also stated that the Directive “does not affect” labour law or criminal law.6 This
wording suggests the provision is descriptive rather than prescriptive, in which case its
accuracy may be doubted—there are later Articles which clearly could be interpreted to
affect these areas. However, as a guide to interpretation it may well assume a de facto
prescriptive function and become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Similar remarks could be
made about the provision that the Directive “does not concern” private international law,
and “does not deal with” the liberalisation of services of general economic interest.7
It is however possible not to be concerned with something, and even not to deal with
something, while nevertheless having a considerable effect on it.8
Further, the Directive takes second place to other Community legislation.9 Thus where
a matter is elsewhere regulated this takes priority over the Directive, meaning that many
other issues of great relevance are in fact also excluded, such as qualifications, posted
workers, and social security.
It has been argued that the scope of all these exceptions and limitations is such that the
Directive no longer matters very much. However, the Directive continues to apply to
2 Art.2(1).
3 Art.2.
4 Art.2(2)(a).
5 Art.19(b) in particular may be relevant to study financing.
6 Art.1(5) and 1(6).
7 Art.3(2); Art.1(3).
8 This is the insight behind regulatory competition.
9 Art.3(1).
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many of the professional and consumer services typically provided by relatively small
organisations, and since these are the ones who may be most deterred by legal and
bureaucratic obstacles from foreign expansion it may not be inappropriate to focus this
general legislation on them and leave big industries to enjoy their own sectoral laws.
A list of examples is provided in the Preamble. It includes management consultancy,
certification and testing, facilities management including office maintenance, advertising,
recruitment services, commercial agents, legal and fiscal advice, real estate services,
construction, the services of architects, the distributive trades, the organisation of trade
fairs, car rental, travel agents, tour guides, tourism and leisure services, sports centres
and amusement parks, and, to the extent that they are not excluded as part of healthcare,
household services such as support for the elderly.10 Except in so far as other secondary
legislation is relevant and takes precedence, all these fall within.
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how much the distinction between within and without
matters. Does it change the substance of the applicable law? This is the subject of the
two sections below.
Comparison with Articles 43 and 49 EC
The chapter on establishment does not appear to add anything significant to the existing
interpretations of Art.43 provided by the Court of Justice. There is barely a sentence
that a lawyer could not have confidently stated to be the law on the basis of the cases
alone. In general, requirements made of service providers or conditions for access to or
exercise of a service activity must be non-discriminatory, necessary to meet a legitimate
aim, and proportionate, reflecting the formulas found in Sa¨ger and Gebhard.11 Fairly
uncontroversial examples are provided of prohibited requirements and those to be subject
to evaluation against the criteria above.12
The fact that the Directive does not change things is not in itself a problem. Not
all jurisdictions are equally happy with the idea that judgments represent law, so the
translation of cases into legislation is far from pointless. In practice there are many
bodies and individuals that will become aware of and attempt to comply with legislation
but will not scrutinise and interpret judgments. Moreover, the use of examples may well
provide additional useful clarity. One could interpret the uncontroversial nature of this
chapter as an acknowledgment that the Court of Justice has done good interpretative
work which the other institutions are now attempting to build on.
The services chapter is a little more difficult. For a start, it contains a list of extra
exceptions, including services of general economic interest provided in another Member
State (thus these are not excluded where it is the recipient who crosses the border),13
matters to do with notaries, and the judicial recovery of debts.14 However, more
problematic is the substance of Art.16 itself, the article dealing with freedom to provide
services, and the one which encapsulates the public debate about this Directive.
10 Preamble, at para.33.
11 Case C-76/90, Sa¨ger v Dennemeyer [1991] E.C.R. I-4221; Case C-55/94, Gebhard [1995] E.C.R. I-4165.
12 Arts 14 and 15.
13 For the rights of recipient of services see Arts 19–22.
14 Art.17.
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That article comes close to copying the one on establishment and similarly following
Gebhard, providing as it does that access to or exercise of a service activity must not be
subject to requirements unless they are non-discriminatory, justified, and proportionate.
However, the sting is that whereas the establishment chapter permits justification “by an
overriding reason relating to the public interest”, Art.16(1)(b) says that the requirements
“must be justified for reasons of public policy, public security public health or the
protection of the environment”. It thus excludes the possibility of justification on the
basis of so-called mandatory requirements. It makes the country of origin principle,
already partially reflected in the presumptive mutual recognition of Cassis de Dijon,15 a
step more absolute. Host states can only impose domestic laws concering access to or
exercise of service activities where these fall within Treaty exceptions or are necessary
for environmental reasons.
It is not clear how much this matters. The only non-environmental mandatory requirement
relied on to any great extent is consumer protection.16 Moreover the impact of removal
of this exception is mitigated by several factors. First, the success rate of attempts to
rely on it has not been great anyway, at least in the context of goods,17 and there is no
particular reason to expect a difference in judicial approach for non-sensitive services.
Secondly, the Directive provides in Ch.V for detailed and comprehensive provision of
information to consumers of services. The consumer is not therefore abandoned, and the
preference for information rather than regulation of substance as a method of consumer
protection is not new to Community law.18 Thirdly, Art.16 only applies to a limited
residue of services, most of which are not particularly sensitive or life-threatening, and
so for which information requirements may arguably be seen as an appropriate form of
protection. Finally, one should not forget that the myth of the approximate equivalence
of standards in different Member States is not entirely without foundation.19 The fact that
service providers continue to be regulated by their host state should therefore provide
some limited consolation.
In any case, it is not beyond argument that the Article does not have even this
limited effect. Its wording is in fact very similar to that of the Treaty, which nowhere
mentions mandatory requirements. The Court managed to interpret this additional class
of exceptions into the concept of a restriction in Art.49.20 There is nothing principled
stopping it from doing exactly the same with the Directive. Further, it might be
unprincipled not to: if a restriction justified by a mandatory requirement does not offend
Art.49 then it is not obvious why it should offend an identically worded provision of
secondary legislation.
15 Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon [1979] E.C.R. 649.
16 Cases on healthcare have relied importantly on others, but healthcare is excluded from the Directive.
See Davies, “The Process and Side-effects of the Harmonisation of European Welfare States” Jean Monnet
Working Paper 02/06 www.jeanmonneprogram.org for details.
17 See Weatherill, “Recent Case Law Concerning the Free Movement of Goods: Mapping the Frontiers of
Market Deregulation” (1999) 36 C.M.L. Rev. 51.
18 R. Fair, Trading in EC Law: Information and Consumer Choice in the Internal Market (Europa, 2005).
19 See Weiler, “The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and Context in the Evolution of the
Free Movement of Goods” in The Evolution of EU Law (Craig and de Burca eds, OUP, 1999).
20 Davies, “Can Selling Arrangements be Harmonised?” (2005) 30 E.L. Rev. 370 at pp.376–377.
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Against this is the fact that mandatory requirements are specifically mentioned in the
establishment chapter.21 It is thus the clear intention that the scope of exceptions to free
movement of services is to be narrower than the scope of those applying to establishment,
and moreover that restrictions merely in the “public interest” but not within “public
policy, public security, public health or the protection of the environment” are not to
apply to services. In substance this too is a continuation of the Court’s case law. While
in principle allowing mandatory requirements to apply to services it has also emphasised
that it is disproportionate to apply national law to foreign service providers to the same
extent as it would be to apply to those establishing.22 The Directive, using different
language, reflects this observation.
A contrast with the Treaty Articles is to be found in the description of the type of
measures to which the Directive applies. Both establishment and service chapters are
concerned with measures which restrict “access to” or “exercise of” a service activity.
The Treaty however refers to “restrictions on freedom” to provide services or establish,
a more open phrase. Indeed, it has been generously read by the Court to encompass any
measure liable to “hinder or make less attractive” the exercise of the freedoms.23 The
Directive therefore arguably incorporates a requirement of directness which the Treaty
does not.24 It is possible to imagine a measure which certainly makes service provision
or establishment less attractive—for example planning restrictions, the cost of buying
a house, or even advertising rules—yet does not seem to be concerned with access
or exercise as such. On the other hand, in practice the Court has been suspicious of
challenges to such indirect hindrances, tending to find that their lack of unequal effect
places them outside the Treaty.25 Nevertheless, it is notable that the Directive chose to
adopt a less general wording than the Treaty.
The relationship with Articles 43 and 49
In general the Treaty Articles and the Directive provide for such similar degrees of
freedom that it will not matter which applies to a situation. This is a fortiori so
because where the Directive provides lists of prohibited and suspicious requirements
these are likely to be useful interpretative tools for the Court, and national courts, even
in situations to which the Directive does not apply. It would be surprising if the concepts
of discriminatory and unjustifiable restrictions diverged significantly in the two contexts.
However, if there is divergence, which takes precedence?
The specific statements that the Directive does not affect labour or criminal law might
mean that a service provider (or recipient) could challenge a national measure under
21 Art.15(3).
22 Case C-76/90, Sa¨ger v Dennemeyer [1991] E.C.R. I-4221; Case C-58/98, Corsten [2000] E.C.R. I-7919.
23 Case C-55/94, Gebhard [1995] E.C.R. I-4165.
24 Preamble, at para.9.
25 See Joined Cases C 544/03 & 545/03, Mobistar v Commune de Fle´ron and Belgacom Mobile v Gemeente
Schaarbeek [2005] E.C.R. I-7723; Case C-134/03, Viacom Outdoor [2005] E.C.R. I-1167; Meulman and
de Waele, “A Retreat from Sager? Servicing or Fine Tuning the Application of Article 49 EC” (2006) 33
L.I.E.I. 207 at pp.223–226; Hatzopoulos and Do, “The Case Law of the ECJ Concerning the Free Provision
of Services: 2000–2005” (2006) 43 C.M.L. Rev. 923 at pp.959–960. See also (written prior to these cases,
but invaluable for context) Woods, Free Movement of Goods and Services within the European Community
(Ashgate, 2004), pp.209–218.
(2007) 32 E.L. REV. April  SWEET & MAXWELL AND CONTRIBUTORS 2007
Gareth Davies 237
the Treaty, which has no such limitation,26 but not under the Directive, even though it
applies to the service in question. Should the limits of the Directive be transposed to the
Treaty? Not to do so undermines these expressed limits. However the better argument
is that to do so is to confuse the hierarchy of secondary and primary law. The Directive
cannot detract from a fundamental freedom. Its express limitations are comments on
its scope, not that of the directly effective Treaty freedom as such.27 The effect is that
these limitations in the Directive lose a great deal of force, although they may still have
some purpose in the context of the administrative provisions and information exchange
between states.
An alternative situation is that a requirement is prohibited by Art.16, but would be
permitted under Art.49 EC because it serves a mandatory requirement. Here the Directive
provides more liberty to service providers, and one might expect it to have precedence.
It is however odd that a piece of secondary legislation should be subordinate to all other
secondary legislation and yet superior to the Treaty itself. This is a feat of hierarchical
gymnastics reminiscent of Art.18 EC.28 Put another way, if the Court finds that Art.49
EC does not remove the competence of states to enforce a type of measure, then it is not
obvious that secondary legislation aimed at implementing Art.49 EC can do so. Were
the Directive to be based on Arts 94, 95 or 308 EC one might perhaps argue that the
scope of the internal market, as understood in those Articles, is broader than the four
freedoms.29 However this Directive is based on Arts 47 and 52 EC, which permit only
Directives to achieve the free movement of services and establishment. It seems that if
Art.16 is to have a sufficient legal base it must be the case that Art.49 EC is not fully
directly effective: the concept which it defines, and which can be legislated upon, is
therefore broader than the use to which it can be put by courts.30
This is perhaps not so odd. Direct effect is essentially a requirement of justiciability.
Assessing the legitimacy of different mandatory requirements involves precisely the sorts
of political judgments that one might expect courts to be restrained about and that are
appropriately left to the legislator. By contrast, if a mandatory requirement is accepted
in principle then the more technocratic question of whether a measure actually serves it
in a proportional manner is perhaps one that courts can attempt, and of course do.
A third, but related, situation, concerns those services excluded from the Directive,
notably healthcare. Many MEPs who supported this exclusion were under the impression
that they were protecting health services from the requirements of free movement, and the
political argument will certainly be made that this should be its result—it is apparently,
at least possibly, what was intended. However, it is difficult to see any way in which
the Directive can prevent or diminish the (long-established) application of Arts 43 and
26 e.g. Case C-274/96, Bickel and Franz [1996] E.C.R. I-763; Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch [1974]
E.C.R. 1405.
27 See also Art.3(3): “Member States shall apply the provisions of this Directive in compliance with the
rules of the Treaty on the right of establishment and the free movement of services”. This is not quite the
point, which is whether a difference between Treaty and Directive is necessarily a lack of compliance.
28 Art.18 provides “Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the
territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the
measures adopted to give it effect”.
29 See Davies, “Can Selling Arrangements be Harmonised?”, cited above, at p.374.
30 ibid.
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49. The most that can happen is that the Court can take a hint as to the political mood
from the healthcare exclusion and be more sympathetic to Member State objections to
free movement in this sphere.
Abuse and the country of origin principle
It is increasingly common for states to argue that a particular use of free movement
is “abusive”.31 This is often when companies migrate to lightly regulated jurisdictions
while continuing to do most or all of their business in more heavily regulated ones,
making this move in order to avoid the burden of the more regulated state. They are
simply making a strategic choice as to the most advantageous place of establishment,
and decoupling this choice from the location of their customers. They are able to do
so because the free movement of services entitles them to act throughout the EU from
any state.32 In general the Court has therefore found that such behaviour, being simply a
reliance on a Treaty right, cannot be seen as abuse.33 However this finding is mitigated
by the possibility for states to rely on mandatory requirements to impose at least some
of their more important standards and regulatory requirements on service providers. That
possibility is now removed, within its scope, by Art.16.
One the one hand this makes the need for a doctrine of abuse perhaps more urgent.
The attractions of jurisdiction shopping have become greater, and one might think
that the Court needs to establish the legitimate limits to this.34 On the other hand, the
philosophy embedded in Art.16 is that such jurisdiction shopping is legitimate. Support
for a minimally-limited country of origin principle, which the Article displays, must
rationally entail a belief that companies should be able to choose which country it will
be.35 Otherwise companies doing business in state A are all subject to different regulatory
requirements according to where they are located, and there is nothing any of them can
do about it; migration in order to minimise the disadvantages they suffer relative to
their competitors would be abusive! Such an approach would be legislating for distorted
competition, and also for discrimination on the basis of nationality.36
Even if establishment is free, Art.16 remains problematic. One of the justifications
for a country of origin rule is that if service providers are subject to both home and
host state regulation they will bear a double regulatory burden which will disadvantage
them relative to domestic providers. In a broad sense therefore it is an equalising rule.
However, as the Court has recognised, matters are not so black and white and one relevant
consideration in deciding whether host state law may be applied is whether there is in fact
31 See E. Sørensen, “Abuse of Rights in Community Law: A Principle of Substance or Merely Rhetoric?”
(2006) 43 C.M.L. Rev. 423; Kjellgren, “On the Border of Abuse—the Jurisprudence of the European Court
of Justice on Cirvumvention, Fraud and other Misuses of Community Law” [2000] E.B.L. Rev. 179.
32 All the more so since even a structural and regular provision of services does not necessarily fall within
establishment. See Case C-215/01, Schnitzer [2003] E.C.R. I-14847; Hatzopoulos and Do, “The Case Law of
the ECJ Concerning the Free Provision of Services: 2000–2005” (2006) 43 C.M.L. Rev. 923 at pp.927–930.
33 Case C-212/97, Centros [1999] E.C.R. I-1459; Case C-147/03, Commission v Austria [2005] E.C.R.
I-5969; E. Sørensen, cited above, at pp.444–445.
34 See Preamble, at para.79.
35 See Woods, Free Movement of Goods and Services within the European Community (Ashgate, 2004),
pp.178–179.
36 See A.G. Lenz in Case C-56/96, VT4 [1997] E.C.R. I-3143 (discussed in Woods, ibid ).
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similar or equivalent protection of the relevant interest in the home state laws.37 In simply
abolishing mandatory requirements the Directive goes beyond this. It creates a situation in
which providers located in a light regulation state but doing business in a high regulation
state will have a significant competitive advantage over domestic producers. Nor can
this fact be taken account of or mitigated by use of mandatory requirements. One may
therefore say that the Directive entrenches and extends the situations in which service
providers will be advantaged or disadvantaged on a given market according to their state
of establishment. Alas, this latter phrase is a reasonably accurate description not only of
the legal concept of a distortion of the conditions of competition but also of discrimination
on grounds of nationality. Thus Art.16 appears to violate Art.12 EC, the prohibition on
nationality discrimination, and to conflict with the Art.3(g) EC requirement that the
internal market be a place of undistorted competition. One must query whether there is
competence to legislate to increase distortions of competition, let alone discrimination.38
The arguments above could also be made about some of the Court’s case law.39 However,
courts are limited in what they can do. They cannot write law, but must choose least
bad options. The function, one might think, of legislative competence is to deal with
situations where none of the judicial options is ideal. For example where creating free
movement results in distorted competition one might seek harmonising legislation which
allows the movement while removing the distortion. By contrast, this Directive appears
to embrace the problems of negative harmonisation and copy them onto the page. Instead
of compensating for the limitations of the judicial method it adopts them. Why legislate
then?
The feasability and impact of the administrative requirements
The answer may lie in the administrative provisions. While the establishment and services
chapters provide much doctrinal food for thought, the real importance of the Directive
is elsewhere. Its proper title should perhaps be “the Directive on harmonisation and
modernisation of public administration”.
The first point is the scope and imprecision of the demands made. Article 5:
“Member States shall examine the procedures and formalities applicable to access to
a service activity and to the exercise thereof. Where procedures and formalities
examined under this paragraph are not sufficiently simple, Member States shall
simplify them.”
Some Member States have in fact been engaging in a systematic review of all relevant
national law.40
37 See Case 279/80, Webb [1981] E.C.R. I-3305; O’Leary and Fernandez-Martin, “Judicially Created
Exceptions to Free Provision of Services” in Services and Free Movement in EC Law (Andenas and Roth
eds., OUP, 2002), pp.168–170.
38 See Davies, “Services, Citizenship and the Country of Origin Principle” a Europa Institute Online
Working Paper at www.law.ed.ac.uk/europa .
39 See von Heydebrand u.d. Lasa, “Free Movement of Foodstuffs, Consumer Protection, and Food
Standards in the European Community: has the Court of Justice got it Wrong?” (1991) 16 E.L. Rev. 391.
40 e.g. the Netherlands.
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Additionally the Directive provides for single points of contact, through which providers
of services must be able to complete all the necessary procedures and formalities
necessary for them to engage in their activities.41 Here they, and service recipients,
must be able to access information about all the requirements applicable to providers
established in their territory, means of redress in the event of disputes, contact details for
authorities, and other useful things.42 Finally, it must be possible for all the procedures
and formalities relating to service activities to be completed electronically at a distance
via this single point of contact, thus via email or internet.43
The chapter also contains provision for harmonisation. The Commission, following
the comitology procedures, may introduce harmonised forms for the formalities and
procedures applicable to service provision, and it shall adopt “detailed rules” for the
implementation of the electronic interface requirement, “with a view to facilitating the
interoperability of information systems”.44
The scope of the e-government provisions is imprecise. Which formalities “relate” to
service activities? Does this include the renting of residential or commercial premises?
Or the employing of staff? The registering of the service provider’s children for childcare?
There will be many difficult lines to draw. One could argue, following the case law, that
if the formalities hinder the activity, they relate to it, but this would then lead to a
very broad interpretation, potentially including any measure applying to a migrant or a
business person.45
In any case, the electronic interaction which the Directive demands is likely to spread into
other areas. Having created this infrastructure it would be inefficient and even strange
not to use it for a wider range of formalities and interactions, even if not strictly to
do with services. The fixed cost of the system is likely to be more important than the
marginal cost of each new procedure brought within it. We may expect the Directive to
therefore contribute to a broader change in the way authorities interact with citizens. Most
importantly, it would be bizarre to create such a system and restrict its use to foreign
supplicants, while their domestic peers are required to use old-fashioned methods. In
fact, as the next section suggests, the chapter may apply internally anyway. But even if
not, the systems it calls for are likely to be applied within the state as a matter of fact.
Thus the final consequence of the chapter approaches the revolutionary. It is likely to
result in citizens all over the EU interacting with their governments electronically, through
very similar portals and software. This raises the question of competence. Can the free
movement of services be used to reform and harmonise the state? On the one hand,
the measures certainly may promote the free movement of services and establishment.
However, subsidiarity may be an issue. It is reasonable to demand that Member States
make their formalities simple and accessible, but demanding that they do it electronically
via single points of contact is arguably taking away more discretion than necessary. One
41 Art.6.
42 Art.7.
43 Art.8. Also Art.7(3).
44 Art.5; Art.8.
45 Gebhard, cited above; Spaventa, “From Gebhard to Carpenter. Towards a (Non)economic European
Constitution” (2004) 41 C.M.L. Rev. 743.
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can imagine a reasonably simple and accessible system which nevertheless requires the
use of paper and contact with more than one office.
Proportionality may be the greater problem. As ever, this is a matter of balancing.46
Is the benefit here proportional to the cost? Government is not just red tape, it is also
culture. Ways of ruling and interacting with citizens reflect images of the state, as does
the way authority is allocated to sub-state units, and the freedom they are given in
how to use this. One hesitates to defend bureaucracy, but there is a social and political
cost in rendering the administration faceless, uniform and unified, even if it is efficient,
just as there is an economic and social cost in taking away Member State freedom to
experiment with different forms of interaction and administration. It is hard to believe,
looking at the casual brevity of the administrative chapter, that these costs were fully
weighed before deciding to proceed with this EU wide harmonisation and modernisation
of public administration.
Does the Directive apply to situations internal to one state?
Perhaps the most important practical question about this Directive is whether it applies
to service providers in their home state. If so, this makes it more radical than would
otherwise be the case. Yet the logic and wording of some of the Articles make a denial
of such internal effect problematic.
For some chapters this is a non-issue. The services chapter refers throughout to the
imposition of obligations on providers established in another state. Moreover, the only
sense to having a chapter on establishment and a chapter on services is if the latter deals
with cross-border provision. Yet the chapters on establishment and on administrative
simplification have another logic.
As a matter of wording, both appear to be general. Consider: “Member States shall
examine the procedure and formalities applicable to access to a service activity and the
exercise thereof” (Art.5(1)); “Member States shall ensure that it is possible for providers
to complete the following procedures and formalities through points of single contact
(. . .)” (Art.6(1)); “Member States shall not make access to a service activity or the
exercise thereof subject to an authorisation scheme (. . .)” (Art.9(1)). Other Articles in
the chapters use similar formulas. Moreover, the Directive is expressed to apply to
“services supplied by providers established in a Member State” with a notable absence
of reference to any cross-border element. Similarly, a provider is defined as a person
“established in a Member States, who offers or provides a service”, again with a notable
absence of any cross-border requirement.47
In short the natural reading of the chapters is general. They would seem to apply to
persons already within their borders, residents or companies, who wish to set up a new
economic entity or provide new services, or to those coming from abroad. Moreover, it
46 See Davies, “Subsidiarity: the Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time” (2006) 43 C.M.L.
Rev. 63 at pp.81–83.
47 Nor does the title of the chapter “freedom of establishment” provide against a case against. While that
title clearly refers to a cross-border concept, it leaves open whether this is to be achieved by harmonisation
or not.
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would be truly strange if this were not the case. If two individuals both wish to open a
travel agency, would it be rational to have different tests of legality for the formalities and
substantive requirements involved, according to whether the individual proposing to start
the business is currently resident domestically or abroad? This is even more true since
the prohibition on discrimination means that they will be subject to the same procedures
and rules. It is not even clear how such a distinction would work. Should the domestic
resident move abroad for a few months in order to be able to use the simplified internet
procedures and to be able to hold the authorities and their regulation to standards of
proportionality? Perhaps a market for foreign “sleeping partners” will come into being.
The argument against this may be based on competence. This Directive implements
Arts 43 EC and 49 EC, and is therefore limited to achieving free movement of services
and freedom of establishment. It cannot apply beyond those Articles, and they do not
apply to internal situations. As the Court has said, if Member States wish to impose
unreasonably burdensome regulation on those establishing at home instead of abroad,
that is their business.48 However, this is not a good argument. The internal situation is a
phenomenon of case law. Courts can only apply the Treaty Articles to those engaged in
cross-border activities because the Treaty Articles are expressed only to apply to these.
That is not the same as saying that harmonisation to achieve free movement across
borders must be so narrow. Indeed, the opposite is the norm. Harmonisation of standards
of products and services, aimed at achieving free movement of these, usually applies
throughout the EU, without distinction between exported and domestically sold products
or services.
Thus both a purely cross-border application of the establishment and administrative
simplification chapters and a general one are sufficient to achieve the ends of free
movement. Yet the cross-border limitation means that these chapters would allocate
rights according to origin, that the individuals wishing to open their travel agency would
find that the efficiency, proportionality and reasonableness that they could demand of
the law and authorities would depend upon their passport or where they had previously
been resident. One meets here the same problem as with Art.16; this would be legislation
entrenching nationality discrimination and distortions of competition.49 As such it would
be invalid.
Thus a reading of the chapters which is consistent with their wording and with any
notion of equality or fair competition finds them to be imposing general requirements
of proportionality and simplicity and accessiblity on all national law and authorities
concerned with service activities, requirements which can be enforced by those affected
irrespective of their origins. That is not to say that the results will always be the same
for domestic and non-domestic providers. What is proportionate may depend upon the
individual context, such as whether the individual is also subject to the jurisdiction of
another state which also supervises or checks. However, the principles of law to be
applied are now uniform for those of all origins and nationalities, domestic or foreign.
This is truly an attempt to redesign and control national regulation of economic activities.
Given the similarity between the wording of the establishment chapter and the Treaty it is
48 e.g. Case C-64/96, Uecker and Jacquet [1997] E.C.R. I-3171; Case C-108/98, RI-SAN [1999] E.C.R.
I-5219; Case 98/86, Mathot [1987] E.C.R. 809.
49 See above.
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in substance a legislative abolition of the internal exception. Regarding the administrative
simplification chapter it is substantive administrative law harmonisation on an impressive
scale. For these reasons there is a good chance that the Court will not find the chapters to
apply internally. It is possible to muster superficially acceptable arguments against such
application. These do not, however, stand up to principled scrutiny.
The fundamental problem is this: a country of origin principle is only sustainable in a
Community that does not mind about competitive advantages gained through regulatory
difference, that is relaxed about the regulatory bumps in the playing field, and is not
sensitive to advantage or disadvantage based on origin.50 For better or worse, that is
not the EU today. In the case law a form of country of origin rule may be seen as a
least bad option, a way of creating a market using the limited scope of judicial powers.
However, to consciously harmonise for it is to reject the principles of Arts 12 and 3(g)
of the Treaty.
The information and co-operation chapters
Member States are required to ensure that service providers make information available
to recipients, concerning, among other things, their official address, contact details, law
governing the contract, insurance, regulatory authorities and the content and price of the
service they are offering.51 There is a discretion as to how this information is provided
but the emphasis is on clarity and accessibility. At the request of the recipient they
must also supply information on codes of conduct for their profession and professional
rules.52 Member States may in addition take measures to ensure that service providers are
adequately insured.53 These provisions may therefore be seen as the consumer protection
section of the Directive, with the principle being that a well-informed and insured
consumer is a protected one.
As a corollary of this approach, service providers are given some rights to communicate
and inform—that is to say to advertise. Total prohibitions on commercial communication
by the regulated professions are to be removed, although limitations may be necessary
for the public interest to remain.54 Thus it is not necessarily the case that doctors and
barristers must be allowed to advertise directly to the public. It will be up to Member
States to interpret the fairly imprecise Art.24.
Further, there are provisions concerning multi-disciplinary partnerships, prohibiting
prohibitions of these, except where necessary to comply with professional ethics and
conduct.55 Once again, this is a clause whose meaning is open and disputable. In any case,
where such partnerships occur, Member States acquire a Community law responsibility
to ensure conflicts of interest are prevented and impartiality is secured.
50 Davies, “Is mutual Recognition an Alternative to Harmonisation? Lessons on Trade and Tolerance of
Diversity from the EU” in Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Bartels and Ortino eds.,
OUP, 2006), p.265; Davies, “Services, Citizenship and the Country of Origin Principle”, cited above.
51 Art.22.
52 ibid.
53 Art.23.
54 Art.24. See also Preamble, at para.100.
55 Art.25.
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Later in the chapter, Member States are encouraged to stimulate, in co-operation with the
Commission, quality certification and assessment schemes, including the development of
European standards.56
This chapter also appears to apply to all service providers, not just those engaged in
cross-border activity.
The next chapter concerns administrative co-operation between Member States, and
requires them to provide information on service providers to each other, quickly and
sometimes electronically.57 This concerns, for example, whether a service provider is
responsible and lawful in his home state, which is of course relevant to those receiving
services from him elsewhere. This information is to be exchanged via contact points
and networks of national authorities, which will be created and promoted with the
active involvement of the Commission, which will also, in the case of health, safety
and environment related information, lay down “and regularly update” “detailed rules”
concerning the management of the network.58
One of the risks of this is of unjustified blacklisting. If a single Member State posts
the information that a service provider is untrustworthy, in violation of local law, or
bankrupt, this will be transmitted throughout the EU and may have devastating effects.
However, such assessments can of course arise in error, and may even arise because of
delay; because a state fails to receive confirmation on time that these things are not the
case. The potential impact of such an information network should go hand in hand with
measures to ensure those affected can protect their rights. While of course national public
law remains available, no doubt now filled out by EU rights—since arguably a challenge
to a national authority’s assessment is now within the scope of EU law59 —the Directive
does not address the issue. In particular, there is no provision for the withdrawal of alerts
or warnings or erroneous information. This is regrettable, because it cannot be assumed
that information that an accusation was wrong will spread as quickly and effectively
through the EU-wide system as the original accusation did. Mud sticks, and there ought
to have been a provision for cleaning it off.
Importantly, Member States also have an obligation to supervise service providers
established in their territory and enforce the relevant laws. In particular, the fact that
a service was provided in another state shall not be a reason for them not to take
relevant supervisory or enforcement action.60 One of the great risks of country of origin
regulation—perhaps of any international service market—is that states will have no
interest in regulating providers who primarily do business abroad, and will even have
a positive interest in laxity, as this may be appreciated by the providers. Thus there is
a real risk of quality of supervision diminishing however splendid the written law. To
a lesser extent states may also not be interested in supervising foreign providers active
on their territory, and may concentrate their efforts on domestic operators; it is easier to
supervise them. Article 31 deals with this. Thus these provisions address the problems of
56 Art.26.
57 Arts 28, 29, 32–35.
58 Art.32.
59 See Case 5/88, Wachauf [1989] E.C.R. 2609.
60 Art.30.
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enforcement, although of course they cannot remove the structural conflicts of interest,
and will not be sufficient alone to change administrative cultures.
These chapters are about the harmonisation and integration of national authorities. They
are not only to communicate but to be brought within networks and shared structures and
rules. This is to occur under the leadership of the Commission. A vision of a European
wide regulatory sector, with functional decentralisation to the Member States, but a
centralised framework and mission, is quite clear. This will surprise those who thought
of supervisory and administrative authority as a Member State matter, but fits with the
rest of the Directive.
Implementation
It is difficult to assess what implementation this Directive requires. Much of it is not
legislative, but consists of reviewing national rules and systems, to ensure that they
function sufficiently quickly and simply and comply with the substantive chapters. How
much legal change is necessary will vary from state to state. There may be equal variation
in how prepared states are to credit that change to the Directive. Many states are already
busy with developing e-government, and simplifying bureaucracy, for example, and
increasing the accessibility and speed of authority can reasonably be seen as an ongoing
process. Must legal changes in these areas now permanently carry the stamp of the
Directive? This is a subtle form of ideological colonialism, to anticipate and appropriate
developments that would largely have happened anyway.
Conclusion
The Directive is economically liberal but politically illiberal. It centralises. The country
of origin principle and the administrative provisions are both highly intrusive rules which
take away national autonomy to a significant extent. Social, cultural and political freedom
is removed in the name of economic freedom. The Directive is disproportionate.
More relevantly, it is economically dubious. Increased services trade will bring benefits,
but a loss of innovation and creativity in the governmental sphere will bring costs which
in the long term are probably higher. Anyone believing in the stimulating effects of
decentralisation, competition, and markets ought also to realise that it is important for
Europe’s vitality that these principles are applied widely, and Member States retain
freedom to develop their legal and governmental systems.
One wonders if those involved in this Directive appreciated its potential effects and
understood the importance and uniqueness of the structures of authority in a state. The
Directive may be the result of narrow thinking and departmentalised government. The
economic models which predict it will bring benefits do not consider the economic price
of its political, social and cultural effects. Such assessments are too difficult to make
in the quantitative language of economics. The answer to this is not to ignore the non-
economic factors. It is not to allow Directives about government to be written by those
thinking only about trade.
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